This is an in-flight demonstration of the techniques and procedures for avoiding rain showers using the RDR2000 color weather radar with vertical profile in the Piper PA46 aircraft. It is posted elsewhere on YouTube and in my training library but it is getting a lot of views and positive comments, so here it is again. I hope you find it useful.

Accident Review

3 March 2014

Truckee, CA

By Dick Rochfort, ATP, CFII - Master Instructor

NTSB Identification: WPR14FA127
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Monday, March 03, 2014 in Truckee, CA
Aircraft: PIPER PA 46 350P, registration: N9281F
Injuries: 1 Fatal,1 Serious.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On March 3, 2014, at 1032 Pacific Standard Time, a Piper PA 46 350P, N9281F, collided with terrain approximately 5 miles east of the Truckee-Tahoe Airport, Truckee, California. The commercial pilot was seriously injured, and the single passenger was fatally injured. The airplane was registered to, and operated by, the commercial pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 91. The airplane's left wing was separated from the fuselage resulting in substantial damage to the airframe. Marginal visual flight rules (MVFR) conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The flight originated at John Wayne-Orange County Airport, Santa Ana, California, about 0800.

The pilot was in communications with Oakland Center while on the GPS-A approach into Truckee-Tahoe Airport. Upon completion of the instrument approach the pilot executed a missed approach and proceeded to fly in an easterly direction not consistent with the published missed approach procedures. Oakland Center lost radar contact and radio communications with the airplane and pilot. The airplane wreckage was located about an hour later in the mountain range east of the airport at an elevation of 8,000 feet mean sea level (msl).

The Truckee-Tahoe Airport Automated Weather Observation System (AWOS-3) reported at 0950 that the wind was from 180 degrees at 7 knots; visibility was 9 statute miles, and an overcast cloud layer was at 3,000 feet above ground level (agl). At 1050, the reported weather conditions were wind from 300 degrees at 5 knots; 6 miles visibility in light rain, and an overcast cloud layer at 2,200 feet agl.

The published minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the Truckee-Tahoe GPS-A approach is 8,200 feet mean sea level (2,300 feet agl).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Talking Points:

This accident will likely be officially labeled “pilot error” - Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT). It is not possible to know at this point, exactly what happened on the morning of March 3, 2014 and I do not wish to criticize the pilot no matter how egregious his errors (if any) may have been. I want to focus on common causal factors for this type of accident and give you, the reader, a few "take-away" ideas that you might readily implement to make yourself a better, safer, more confident pilot.

There are two aspects to every procedure no matter how simple or complicated it may seem. First, the pilot must constantly be aware of the aircrafts position at all times. This task should be simpler in the glass panel cockpit but there is evidence which suggests otherwise. Second, the pilot must know the one best way to make the aircraft go where it is supposed to go with or without the autopilot. It could be said that this second aspect is the bandwidth hog, but the truth is, both can chew up significant bandwidth creating a ripe environment for errors of omission.

Bandwidth management is the ability to not allow distractions to interfere with timely critical task completion. This is not a problem to be solved, it is a condition to be managed. I encourage each pilot to seek the one best way to accomplish these tasks by operating the same way each and every time using a well-vetted set of checklists, flows, memory items and SOP (standard operating experience).

The red line represents the Flight Aware radar track superimposed over the GPS-A at Truckee Airport (figure 1). As of this writing, we don’t know what clearance was received and the track is only an approximation, but it suggests that a non-standard procedure turn was flown and that the missed approach was not flown in a timely manner or in the correct direction.

Staying on the thick black line of the procedure is arguably the most important critical task. One common error which can cause confusion which can lead to this type of accident is a failure of the GPS to automatically sequence during the approach. This subtle but entirely predictable event can lead to a major loss of SA (situational awareness) and/or a serious distraction.

There are a variety of reason why Garmin will not sequence when expected and the logic of this behavior is consistent throughout the GPS Navigator community. The give-away is the green “SUSP” above the OBS button (fig-2). “SUSP” (suspend in Garminology) means that sequencing will not occur; therefore tapping the button will initiate a manual sequence. The remedy is to keep vigilance for the occurrence of a failure to sequence and to simply tap the OBS button to remove the “Suspend” feature or to reactivate the correct leg of the approach using the time honored “direct-direct-enter” sequence. If Garmin sees the aircraft in the correct location, auto sequencing will resume. Note that the current aircraft location in this case (fig–2) is over IPODY, 5 miles outside of MARDR. It is easy to get busy, get distracted and miss the “SUSP” annunciator at this point because IPODY is the final approach fix and typically gear and flaps are introduced here with a power reduction and possible a desire to talk on the radio.

Note also the importance of having cumulative distance (CUM as opposed to DIS) displayed on the flight plan page so there is no confusion about total distance from a particular fix.

While it is well understood that too much information can be a bad thing, it is also true that not enough information can be worse. Note that the map page in Fig 3 shows the aircraft 5 ¼ miles PAST MARDR. MARDR is the Missed Approach point. The best way to keep situational aware is to use the #1 navigator in Map mode (fig-3) and the #2 navigator on the flight plan page with a ‘CUM” distance displayed. Both units should be set to auto cross-fill to ensure that both units are giving proper information.